One of the major issues in digital forensics and attack analysis is the attribution of an attack to a type of malicious adversary. This is especially important to determine the relevance of an incident with respect to the threat it poses to a system. In this work, a holistic scheme to derive characteristics from honeypot data and to map this data to an attacker model is introduced. This scheme takes data that is provided by deception systems of any kind. After that, characteristics are derived that describe different attributes of an attacker. Those are used to categorise threats into one of nine attacker classes. This scheme has been evaluated with real world honeypot data. As expected, most attacks are rather harmless, but a few outliers have been identified.
INTRODUCTION
Cyber security is an emerging and rapidly changing domain. Cyber-attacks cause prominent incidents that happen frequently and often are very complex and significant in nature. Those incidents are caused by different actors with manifold interests and prospects. In majority, the aggressors are not confidently identified. Most of the time, forensic examinations reveal hints and directions but no extrinsic evidence. This leads to a general contestability for security incidents and causes ramifications to be hard to enforce.
In this work, we target the challenge of attribution of security incidents to gain situational awareness for security operators, administrators and researchers. A scheme for the attribution of such incidents is introduced: Yet Another Attribution Scheme (YAAS) . As data sources, YAAS employs data collected by a honeypot. Honeypots are computer resources without productive value. Hostile actions against those systems are trivial to identify since no valid interaction is intended. The accumulated data set builds the foundation of this work by implying the available features for the attribution. Features and their derivates are then assigned to an attacker model called GAMfIS (Fraunholz et al., 2017b) . GAMfIS consists of several classes of attackers and additionally enables to quantify four attributes for each class. The major contribution of this work is the projection from honeypot feature set to the GAMfIS attributes set. A GAMfIS class is assigned to an incident based on the GAMfIS attributes.
The proposed scheme enables the user to gain a fast and robust assessment of cyber incidents and the security state of the network. The data collected with the help of a honeypot is capable of detecting novel threats and zero day exploits as well as breaches of the perimeter, drastically enhancing the situational awareness of operators.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Recently deception systems such as honeypots have become a valuable source for threat intelligence recently. In this work, we differentiate between the theoretical capabilities of those systems and the capabilities our data set supports. Nawrocki (Nawrocki et al., 2016) gives an exhaustive overview of the theoretical capabilities of deception systems as data sensors. However, most sensors do not incorporate all possibilities into one system but focus on certain features or use cases.
Cowrie (Oosterhof, 2014), a medium-interaction honeypot system, was used to collect the data foundation employed in this work. Fraunholz et al. give an investigation of several features in this data set by machine learning techniques (Fraunholz et al., 2017a) . They were able to identify several types of botnets based on those features. Other authors employed Significant Event Discovery (Buda & Bluemke, 2016) , Long-Range Dependency (Zhan & Xu, 2013) , Support Vector Machines (Song et al., 2011) , Principal Components Analysis (Sharma & Mandeep, 2010; Almotairi, 2009 ), Symbolic Aggregate Approximation (Thonnard & Dacier, 2008) and feature correlation (Pham & Dacier, 2011) . All of them indicate that the forensic examination of honeypot data is executable by standard data mining techniques.
There are several attribution schemes and attacker models such as the work of Oweszarski (Oweszarski, 2015) . Most of them focus on specific use cases or assumptions. Oweszarksi, for example, characterises attacks based on meta data on packet level. In this work, GAMfIS is chosen as a foundation for the proposed framework. GAMfIS is a generic model with nine classes of attackers. There are four attributes with distinct values for each class respectively: Skill (S), Resources (R), Motivation (M) and Intention (I). For the definitions of the classes and features within GAMfIS the reader shall be advised to see the introductory GAMfIS publication. This introductory publication also includes a comprehensive comparison to other attacker models. The most frequent attribution attempts consider the Skill as major feature. Several schemes try to approximate the skill by a metric based on the executed actions such as hiding malicious files or check the hardware configuration (Salles-Loustau et al., 2011) .
To provide information as meaningful as possible to human beings, the aggregation and visualisation of data or results are of significant importance. Several approaches are proposed in the context of honeypot data. Fraunholz et al. proposed a dashboard (Fraunholz et al., 2017c) . World maps with markers for the origin country of the IP address are also a frequent visualisation technique (Telekom DTAG, 2017). Tricaud employed Picviz to visualise honeypot data (Tricaud & Amaducci, 2009 ). Other tools used for illustration are Graphviz and Afterglow (Valli, 2009 ).
Further, a number of terms will need to be defined: An Attacker is a single entity associated with a unique tuple (Source IP address, Operating System, User-Agent(Protocol), {Cookies}). We assume that the knowledge of operating system, user agent and set of cookies allows for an enhanced discrimination compared to the source IP address only. The term Attacker builds the foundation for all other terms we are discussing in this work. An attacker's target is described by the destination IP. Each session is a unique tuple (Attacker, Target, Protocol, Time Window). In literature, this time window is typically defined to be 30 or 60 minutes (Nawrocki, 2016) . However, the authors also proposed adaptive thresholds for the classification of sessions (Fraunholz et al., 2017d ). An attack is the sum of all sessions with the same attacker and target combination.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
YAAS transforms a generic feature set v i consisting of honeypot observations in a GAMfIS compatible format. This format is defined by four attributes for each class, where each attribute is quantified by a scalar value in the range {0,…,γ} ∊ ℚ. The parameter γ is the maximal value an attribute can take.
These attributes are further referenced to as S, R, M and I. Each scalar value V is calculated as shown in equation (1).
The total number of features f i is given by n. f i is in the range {0,…,γ} ∊ ℚ, too. The weight for each feature is defined by α, where the sum of all α i is 1. By adding up all features in respect to their individual weighting factor, the scalar value required by GAMfIS is determined and guaranteed to be in the range {0,…,γ}. An overview of YAAS is given in Figure 1 . As it can be seen, Skill and Resources determine the Capability Rating, while Motivation and Intention are employed to calculate the Threat Rating. Both in combination are relevant for the Total Threat score.
To transform the observations made by a honeypot to a feature f, first a set of potential observation features is introduced in Figure 2 . This feature set is a combination of the work from Nawrocki (Nawrocki, 2016) , several honeypot implementations (Oosterhof, 2014; Honeynet Project, 2003) and experiments conducted by the authors (Fraunholz et al., 2017e) . However, all shown features can additionally be correlated with other features or analysed as time series within a session or attack.
In this work, the authors consider only the features shown in Figure 2 . Due to the modularity of the framework, it is easy to implement a more extensive feature set.
Figure 2. Exemplary Feature Set for Attacker Classification
As defined before S, R, M and I are determined by weighted accumulation of all affecting features f i . The features f i are derived from the considered observed features v i . The dimension and boundaries for v i are varying between the parameter and the sensor resolution. The operating system, for example, is usually estimated passively based on the packet characteristics, by tools such as P0f (Zalewski, 2012) . Active probes against the operating systems' communication stack, by tools such as nmap (Vaskovich, 1997) , can increase the estimation quality.
Several features can be employed to assess the observations made regarding S. In case of malware uploads, the malware sophistication can be analysed to estimate S.
The malware detection rate MWDR of various antivirus engines can be analysed. The function aved i (mw) ∊ AVE returns 1 for detected malware and 0 if no malware was detected in the malware sample mw, where AVE is a set of antivirus engines. MWDR is defined as shown in equation (2).
Several antivirus engines enable queries for the threat level of an investigated malware sample. The malware threat level MWTL transforms this information in a feature for GAMfIS as shown in equation (3).
The function avel i describes the response of such a query for the threat level with values limited to {0,…,γ} ∊ ℚ. MWTL is the average estimation of the threat level of all antivirus engines detecting the investigated sample as malicious.
Another feature can be constructed by the attacked protocols. Even though it is difficult to estimate an attackers exploit portfolio, the number of protocols an attacker had interacted with is measureable. The set of all protocols implemented P and the set of protocols an attacker interacted with A can be compared by similarity metrics such as the Jaccard index (Jaccard, 1901) as shown in equation (4).
The proposed metric "protocols per attacker" PPA is a metric to evaluate the protocol portfolio of an attacker. A related metric, called "exploits per attacker" EPA, can be constructed by comparing the implemented vulnerabilities V and the exploits executed against the system E as shown in (5).
To adjust the framework to specific use cases, other similarity metrics can be applied and more features can be added. Another study proposed to quantify the skill level based on the commands issued (Salles-Loustau et al., 2011) , where ten criteria are introduced.
To quantify the resource attribute R, the average value and the standard deviation s are introduced as shown in the equations (6) and (7).
The first example constructed for the resource estimation is based on the assumption that fast inter-arrival times are related to a higher degree of automation correlating with the attackers' resources. The mean inter-arrival time MIA for each attacker can be calculated as shown in equation (8).
To construct a feature compatible to GAMfIS, the standard deviation of the inter-arrival SIA times is determined as shown in equation (9).
The estimation for the degree of automation EDG is defined as shown in equation (10).
The thresholds ω 1 and ω 2 are the limits for the statistically significant amount of inter-arrival times to be in one of the three possible classes. For higher resolutions, the number of classes can be expanded. The dimension of ω 1 and ω 2 is the observed dimension per time unit, e.g. commands per minute or packets per second.
Another possible metric to quantify the resources allocated from a specific attacker, is to apply a similar method to the total amount of invested resources. For example, the number of credentials per attacker CPA can be determined by calculating the average number of credentials employed by an attacker and the standard deviation within the data set. It is important to note that those values need to be determined in advance from a previous collected data set, adapted on the fly while running the attribution scheme or both.
The authors assume that in general, the motivation attribute can be estimated by the time and effort an attacker is investing in a particular attack. To determine M, PPA can be employed again. PPA indicates the ratio of protocols an attacker attempted to exploit against all protocols implemented on the system. A higher number of protocols is linked to a higher motivation of an attacker to successfully exploit a specific system. Other features are the total number of commands per attack, the total duration of an attack and the total number of sessions per attack. Those features can be quantified as described before by mean value and standard deviation.
Quantifying an attacker's intention is the most complex task. GAMfIS defines intention as the degree or potential of maliciousness of an attacker. A simple feature is the system's ability to run, further referenced to as SAR.
If the system is up and running, SAR is set to γ and if the system is flawed, SAR is set to 0. Another feature can be the data destructiveness DD, where D is the set of all data on the system and this data is classified in n subsets D i . DD is then defined as shown in equation (11).
The weighting factor β i indicates the maliciousness assigned to the i-th data subset D i . The function des() returns a value {0,…,γ}∊ ℚ. The value to be returned is correlated with the degree of destructiveness against data within the set Di. A simple definition for des(Di) is to return γ if any data in Di is deleted or altered, where data subsets Di could be classified as system relevant data, sensitive data and other data.
EXPERIMENTAL ASSESSMENT
To project the GAMfIS class attributes to {0,..., γ}∊ ℚ, the sequence of (Fraunholz et al., 2017a) . The classes of the resulting sequences, of the syntax < … < ∀ ∊ , are then transformed to {0,..., γ}∊ ℚ by assigning 1 to the first class and iterating over all classes while incrementing the value by 1 for each less than-operator. Then, all values are normalized as indicated before with γ = 10. Figure 3 shows the quantification results of this method.
Figure 3: Heat Map of the GAMfIS Classes with Voronoi Cells
The cells are coloured with respect to the associated class. Euclidean geometry is employed to calculate the distances between cells and class centre, marked by capitalized abbreviation for the corresponding class.
Each analysed attacker will appear on this map in one cell and will therefore be assigned to one class. Further discussions will employ this model and the proposed quantification as foundation.
The gathered data was analysed in another work (Fraunholz et al., 2017b) . The data set consists of attacks observed by a Cowrie honeypot instance. The instance was operated for 106 days. Figure 4 gives an overview of the deployment.
Figure 4: Overview of the Experimental Set Up
The honeypot was accessible from the Internet but was deployed outside sensitive production networks. Implemented protocols were Telnet and SSH. From previous examinations, the authors made for the data set, the conclusion that most traffic is originating from botnets active in that time, such as Mirai (Anna-senpai, 2016), seems likely (Fraunholz et al., 2017a) .
For the analysis of the results, several metrics were employed in order to determine the values of each attribute respectively. S is determined based on three features: A list of used commands, as described by Salles-Loustau (Salles-Loustau et al., 2011) , the MWDR, based on the VirusTotal (VirusTotal API, 2017) engines and the threat level based on the Symantec antivirus engine. The weights are calculated as shown in equation (12) and equation (13).This has been done in order to give the same relative weight to each feature.
Equations (12) and (13) only hold, if there is at least one non-zero feature in the feature set. The distribution of skills can be found in Figure 5 .
Figure 5: Distribution of Skill Values
The majority of skill values is in the 25-quantile. This is allegedly due to the large amount of relatively simple botnet behaviour in the data set. Fraunholz et al. conducted a thorough analysis of the command-based approach that leads to similar results (Fraunholz et al., 2017a) .
The feature R was derived from inter-arrival time, as well as the number of credentials tried. As discussed in section 3, these characteristics are capable of depicting the amount of resources an attacker has at her disposal. The given value needs to be put on a scale in some fashion. For the inter-arrival time, the means and standard deviations have been computed for each attacker, as described in equations (6) and (7), and compared to threshold values 1 and 2 . For the assessment of the number of credentials tried, the mean and standard deviation of a large data set of credential-based attacks, as previously examined by Fraunholz et al. (Fraunholz et al., 2017c) , is calculated. The number of credentials of each attack of the data set analysed in this work is compared to those values and rated accordingly. The mean was determined to be 36.19 credentials per attack, with a standard deviation of 430.22. These values, however, are highly dependent on the protocol, as mean and standard deviation of all telnet based attacks are 23.66 and 33.84 respectively, whereas the values for SSH are 89.75 and 938.67 respectively. Fraunholz et al. performed a deeper analysis of more protocols (Fraunholz et al., 2017d) . The distribution of resource values can be seen in Figure 6 .
Figure 6: Distribution of Resource Values
The resources of attackers are more widely distributed than the skill set. This is plausible since recently discovered botnets like Mirai and Hajime (Quelle) have a rather limited dictionary of about 60 entries, whereas botnets that are more aggressive employ dictionaries of up to 52.000 entries.
Motivation M is determined by the number of commands entered, the overall number of sessions of an attacker and the time spent in all these sessions. Of each of these characteristics, mean and standard deviation are calculated over all the attacks that were analysed in the course of this work. Depending on the values and the thresholds, the motivation is assigned. The distribution can be found in Figure 7 .
Figure 7: Distribution of the Motivation Values
Since only the current data set was used to calculate mean and standard deviation, the distribution is relatively even. For future works, the usage of a larger data basis is sensible, even though the current work allows for a distinction of comparatively active attackers. Still, it can be seen that each attacker possesses at least a motivation of two, and there are motivations of up to ten.
With the current data set, no possible way to determine the intention of an attacker was found by the authors. They propose analysing binaries and command traces in future works, but at the time being, such information is not available. As the Threat Rating is derived from I and M, I is assigned the value of M in order to obtain sensible values for further analysis. The result of this analysis and the mapping of each attacker to a Total Threat score can be seen in Figure 8 .
Figure 8: Heat Map of the Data Set Captured by Cowrie Honeypot
The given picture paints the threat landscape that is contained in the data set used for this work. If the heat map in Figure 8 is compared to the distribution of attacker prototypes in Figure 3 , trends can be found. Most attackers belong to the Guest-class. Even though they are not guests in the physical sense, this classification makes sense. The servers used to gather the data are reachable from the internet, and most attacks tried to connect to the publicly available web interface. This is the digital equivalent of a guest. The most frequent cell is near the border to Hobby Hacker, which is conform to the assumption that the majority of attacks stems from botnets and is not targeted by professional attackers, such as ethical or state sponsored hackers. Furthermore, some instances of activists can be determined. The observed attacks probably do not belong to any activist groups but contain their characteristics of a higher motivation, but still rather limited resources. Finally, some small instances of external and internal employees as well as more professional attackers, such as ethical or criminal hackers, occur. Even though it is very unlikely that the given instances are really belonging exactly to the supposed classes, the major advantage of the proposed model is shown: From more than 30.000 attackers, the most interesting ones are easily identified and visualised. These attackers are worth a more thorough analysis. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH In this work, a sophisticated scheme to derive attacker characteristics from attack sessions has been proposed. Furthermore, a method to map these characteristics into an attacker model called GAMfIS has been introduced. This scheme was evaluated with an extensive set of attack data containing more than 50.000 entries that was obtained with a honeypot and discussed in previous works. As was to be expected, the attacks consisted almost exclusively of botnet traffic that could be easily mapped to the less dangerous types of attackers.
It is expected that the categorization of attacks according to antivirus engines is highly time dependant. Most attacks are unknown to antivirus software at first, but after a while, they are well known and will be detected easily. As a data set was employed that was recorded several months ago, most binaries were classified as malicious by most antivirus engines. Another issue that was encountered in the course of this work is the determination of threshold values for variables. In general, there are two options: Determining thresholds by statistical analysis and by systematic derivation. The problem with statistical analysis lies in the usually limited sample size and diversity, e.g. it is unlikely that state-sponsored attackers are captured. Deriving thresholds by systematic analysis is hard as it usually is infeasible to find causal relations and maximum values. For future works, the use of a large data basis, as the authors showed for CPA, seems suitable to enhance the quality of threshold values and to increase the expressiveness of the resulting heat map. In addition, statistical analysis is not fit for real time analysis, as there needs to be a sample set first before analysis can be performed. In analysing about 17.000 binaries downloaded by the honeypot, only about 130 distinct malware samples could be identified by hash comparison. This led to the assumptions that most attacks originated in botnet behaviour that employed a very limited set of rather similar exploits. Not even polymorphism or other forms of obfuscation and antivirus evasion techniques were applied, maintaining the theory that most attacks were very basic.
As the attacker is a core concept of this work and the applied attacker model GAMfIS, determining the attacker by different concepts is an interesting topic for future works. It seems promising to help in determining an attacker by correlation of the used infrastructure, such as command and control, as well as download servers.
